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 ARTICLE
FROM PRESUMPTIONS OF FACT
TO PRESUMPTIONS OF CAUSATION :
REFLECTIONS ON THE PERILS OF JUDGE-MADE 
RULES IN QUEBEC MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
par Robert P. KOURI*
Certains jugements québécois rendus dans des causes de responsabilité
civile médicale contiennent des affirmations sur les circonstances où la
causalité se présume. Bien que la Common law admette l’élaboration de
principes par induction, l’établissement de la causalité par présomption de fait
en droit civil dépend essentiellement d’un raisonnement déductif. L’auteur
s’interroge sur l’opportunité d’admettre en droit civil québécois, certains
principes qui semblent ressortir plutôt de la jurisprudence de Common law
                        
Several Quebec judgments rendered in cases involving medical
malpractice contain pronouncements alluding to circumstances under which
causation may be presumed. While the Common law is amenable to the
elaboration of principles derived from a process of inductive reasoning, the
Civil Code relies on deductive reasoning in order to establish causation by
presumption of fact. The writer queries whether dicta apparently originating
from certain Common law decisions should be received in Quebec Civil law.
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1. M. Boulanger, “Les tribunaux et la responsabilité médicale : assisterait-on à une ère moins
conservatrice en matière de procédure, preuve, prescription et quantum?”, in Formation
permanente du Barreau du Québec, Développements récents en responsabilité médicale et
hospitalière (1999), (Cowansville, Qc : Yvon Blais, 1999) 137 at 151. This figure is
somewhat conservative.
2. [1990] 2 S.R.C. 311, rev’g (1988), 84 N.B.R. (2d) 401 (C.A.), aff’g (1986), 77 N.B.R. (2d)
222 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Snell].
3. Ibid. at 326-327. See also E. Picard, G. Robertson, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals
in Canada, 3rd ed., (Scarborough, Ont. : Carswell, 1996) at 226.
4. Houde v. Côté, [1987] R.J.Q. 723 (C.A.) aff’g [1982] C.S. 902 [hereinafter Houde].
5. Gburek v. Cohen, [1988] R.J.Q. 2424 (C.A.) [hereinafter Gburek].
Introduction
According to statistics, successfully suing a physician for malpractice in
Quebec represents a somewhat daunting challenge. One writer states there are
no more than four or five judgments per year in favour of plaintiffs1. Since one
of the causes of this phenomenon obviously relates to difficulties inherent in
discharging the burden of proof of causation, this factor appears to have  induced
the courts to adopt more resiliant attitudes in order to not unduly disadvantage
victims of medical malpractice seeking redress. Indeed, Sopinka J., speaking of
behalf of the Supreme Court in Snell v. Farrell2, has gone so far as to assert that
if he were convinced defendants having substantial connection to the injury were
escaping liability because plaintiffs could not prove causation under currently
applied principles, he would not hesitate to adopt a more flexible approach to
the question3.
This need for flexibility has made itself felt in Quebec where the courts
have, on various occasions, decided that in three different sets of circumstances,
the causal relationship between fault and injury could be presumed. The first
relates to proof that the patient’s record has been altered or left incomplete4, the
second involves situations where, by their wrongful acts or omissions,
defendants, either voluntarily or involuntarily, have put plaintiff in the position
of being unable to prove causation5, and the third occurs when a danger
materializes following a fault which presents a clear risk for the health and
security of the patient.
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6. Supra note 4.
7. Ibid. at 729.
For reasons which will appear evident in the discussion that follows, it
would be appropriate to dispose immediately of the first two instances, namely
the hypothesis of the modified or incomplete medical record and that dealing
with increased difficulty of proving causation due to the fault of defendant. The
third situation - fault presenting a clear danger- although giving rise to a similar
predicament, will be dealt with subsequently and will form the crux of this
article due to the more fundamental issue which it raises.
1 - Medical liability and presumptions of causation of judicial origin
Starting with the hypothesis of an altered or incomplete medical record,
this issue was raised in Houde v. Côté6 involving the liability of an anaesthetist
and a hospital for damages resulting from paralysis of the lower limbs of a
patient following an epidural. One point in contention was whether the physician
had inadequately monitored the patient’s blood pressure during the intervention.
In his concurring opinion condemning the physician, Beauregard J. of the Court
of Appeal wrote :
Or je n’ai pas la preuve de signes cliniques établissant si cette pression
était simplement basse ou trop basse. La raison pour laquelle je n’ai
pas ces signes cliniques, c’est que le défendeur Houde n’a pas tenu
correctement son dossier.
La question est donc la suivante : lorsque le patient ne peut pas faire
la preuve de la cause d’un dommage et, cela, par l’omission du
médecin de lui faire un rapport complet de l’intervention, y a-t-il une
présomption contre le médecin?
Il me semble que oui.7
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8. Ibid. at 730.
9. Ibid. at 728.
10. Supra note 5.
Beauregard J. further added :
Mais, au départ, à cause de son obligation de rendre compte, c’est au
médecin qu’incombe le fardeau de prouver d’une façon précise tout ce
qui s’est produit au cours de l’anesthésie. Autrement, le recours du
patient serait illusoire et la défense du médecin trop simple.8
It should be noted that Mr. Justice Beauregard felt that the trier of fact
had not erred when he concluded that there were sufficient elements of proof to
allow him to rule in favour of plaintiff, even though the primary cause of the
paralysis was not as obvious to him as it was to the trial judge9. Viewed in
context, it would appear evident that the above statements concerning
presumptions of causation in cases where the patient’s record is incomplete were
obiter. More importantly, the other two justices sitting in appeal (Monet,
Chouinard JJ.) did not voice any opinion regarding Justice Beauregard’s dicta
on presumed causation.   From a more practical point of view and in a stricter
sense, if one were to adopt Mr. Justice Beauregard’s thesis on the presumption
of causation under these circumstances, this could only occur if the falsified or
incomplete entry in the medical record was instrumental in preventing plaintiff
from proving causation. Any inaccuracy in recording information otherwise
unrelated to issues of fault and causation in a suit would obviously render any
such presumption irrelevant.
The second hypothesis relating to the  difficulty of proving causation due
to acts or omissions of defendant was evoked in a second case before the Court
of Appeal, Gburek v. Cohen10, which involved the treatment of a patient
requiring the administration of a strong antibiotic having the potential of
adversely affecting renal function and hearing. During treatment, the physician
failed to order renal function tests and audiograms in order to monitor the effects
of the drug, with the result that the patient lost a significant portion of his
hearing. Due to the fact that the physician had not prescribed the requisite
controls, plaintiff was placed in the position of being unable to prove that the
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11. Ibid. at 2447.
12. Indeed, Mr. Justice Chouinard had recourse to presumptions of fact in order to decide that
the deafness would not have occurred had there been no fault of defendant in failing to order
the necessary tests, ibid. at 2429.
13. This point was raised by Madam Justice Deschamps, writing on behalf of the Court of
Appeal panel in Zanchettin v. De Montigny, [2000] R.R.A. 298 at para. 87, aff’g [1995]
R.R.A. 87 (Qc. Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Zanchettin]. She also noted that the opinion of
Beauregard J. in Gburek, supra note 5 and Houde supra  note 4, were decided prior to the
Supreme Court decision in Laferrière v. Lawson, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 541, rev’g [1989] R.J.Q.
27, 49 C.C.L.T. 309 (C.A.) [hereinafter Lawson].
14. Gauthier v. Beaumont, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 65, rev’g [1996] R.D.J. 126, [1995] A.Q.
No. 762 (C.A.Q.), online : QL (A.Q.), aff’g J.E. 90-875 (Qc. Sup. Ct.). Interestingly enough,
the Supreme Court in Joseph Brant Memorial Hospital v. Koziol, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 491,
refused to confirm the Ontario Court of Appeal which had reversed the onus of proof on the
defendant hospital because a nurse had omitted to record the Patient’s vital signs just prior
physician’s fault had indeed caused his deafness. According to Mr. Justice
Beauregard :
À mon avis, même si généralement on caractérise l’obligation générale
du médecin comme une obligation de moyens, lorsque le médecin, en
plus de donner des soins fautifs, empêche son patient d’être en mesure
de prouver la relation causale entre les soins fautifs et un préjudice qui
a pu être causé par ses soins fautifs, il incombe au médecin de prouver
l’absence de lien de causalité.11 
On this occasion as well, the other two Justices (Mailhot, Chouinard JJ)
decided the case in plaintiff’s favour, without adopting Beauregard J.’s
contention that the burden of proof should be reversed12. 
At first blush, it would seem eminently fair to state that a theory or
opinion advanced by the same judge in two cases, especially when his opinion
has not been supported by the other two members of the panel, cannot be
considered as forming jurisprudence13, particularly when the consequences of
any reversal of the burden of proof could have a significant effect on the
outcome of a trial. Although Mr. Justice Beauregard cited no authority for this
reversal of burden, it would appear to reflect an inchoate principle of
fundamental justice expressed in the moral and unwritten precept that no one
should profit from his or her bad faith or wrongdoing14. Yet, one must not lose
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to his death. And yet, Picard and Robertson, supra note 3 at 221 feel that this position has
been somewhat attenuated by the Supreme Court in Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp. (1995),
27 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1 at 41, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634 [hereinafter Hollis cited to C.C.L.T.], aff’g
(1991), 81 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 103 D.L.R. (4th) 520, [1993] 6 W.L.R. 609, (1993), 16 C.C.L.T.
(2d), 140 (C.A.) in that when a victim’s power of proof has been “seriously undermined” due
to defendant’s fault, the onus of proof of causation should not be as onerous as to prove how,
hypothetically, a physician would react.  
15. One must avoid the temptation of using the expression “estoppel” to translate “fin de non-
recevoir” into English. As Mr. Justice Mignault stated in Grace and Company v. Perras
(1921), 62 S.C.R. 166 at 172 : “[The] doctrine of estoppel as it exists in England and the
common law provinces of the Dominion is no part of the law of the Province of Quebec.
This, however, does not mean that in many cases where a person is held to be estopped in
England, he would not be held liable in the Province of Quebec. [...] May I merely add, with
all due deference, that the use of such a word as ‘estoppel’, coming as it does from another
system of law, should be avoided in Quebec cases as possibily involving the recognition of
a doctrine which, as it exists to-day, is not a part of the law administered in the Province of
Quebec.”  See also L. Baudouin, “Conflits nés de la coexistence juridique au Canada”
(1956), 3 McGill L.J. 51 at 57-58.
16. Indeed, poorly kept case notes could call into question the credibility of a defendant
physician’s recollection of events rather than provoke a reversal of burden of proof, see
Tremblay v. Maalouf, [2000] J.Q. No. 2370 at para. 78 (Qc. Sup. Ct.) online : QL (JQ).
17. [1999] R.J.Q. 1658 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2000] 1 S.R.C. xx [hereinafter
St-Jean].
18. [2000] R.R.A. 298 (Qc. C.A.), aff’g [1995] R.R.A. 87 (Qc. Sup. Ct.).
sight of the fact that at most, the rule proposed by Mr. Justice Beauregard does
not constitute a fin de non-recevoir15 or a rule of substantive law but rather a
rebuttable presumption relating to adjective law, more particularly the law of
evidence16. These observations notwithstanding, there are additional reasons to
question the acceptance of this presumption in Quebec law. In light of two more
recent cases decided by the Quebec Court of Appeal, namely St-Jean v.
Mercier17 and Zanchettin v. De Montigny18, it would seem fair to state that
attempts to introduce judge-made presumptions of causation as a means of
facilitating proof are encountering firm resistance. Yet, at the outset, it would be
premature to affirm that these cases constitute a full-blown revirement
jurisprudentiel since, as will be pointed out, the fact-situations in each did not,
in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, readily lend themselves to evoking certain
presumptions.
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19. Supra note 17.
20. Ibid. at 1662, 1665.
For instance in St-Jean19, plaintiff was struck by a car while hitchhiking
along a major highway. Transported by ambulance to a local hospital, he was
initially treated in the emergency department by Dr. Couture, who noted
compound fractures in both legs, head-wounds and abrasions on his abdomen.
Although X-rays of the back showed no abnormalities, Dr Couture noted that he
suspected a fracture of vertebrae D7 and mentioned in the record that the patient
complained of back-pain. Dr Mercier, an orthopedist summoned to treat the
patient, reduced the leg-fractures under general anaesthesia. A second
intervention was performed three days later on the right leg. Meanwhile, since
the patient was still experiencing back-pain, Dr Mercier suspected sciatic nerve
injury. When the patient was subsequently seen by Dr Mercier on an out-patient
basis, signs of spastic paraplegia were noted. Further investigation revealed that
there were fractures to the D8 and D9 verterbrae with medullary compression
thus occasioning permanent paraparesis. Following his accident, St-Jean applied
to the Quebec Automobile Insurance Board for compensation but his request
was refused since the Board felt that there was no direct causal link between the
paraparesis and the automobile accident. Action was initiated against Drs
Couture and Mercier as well as against the hospital. Eventually, the suit against
the hospital was settled out of court. As for the remaining defendants, while in
fact the Superior Court found no fault on the part of defendant physicians, it
indicated that in any case, plaintiff failed to discharge his burden of proving a
causal link between his paralysis and the alleged fault of the physicians. The
Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the Superior Court but for different
reasons regarding Dr Mercier. Unlike the trier of fact, the Court of Appeal held
that Dr Mercier had indeed committed several faults20 but these faults were held
not to have caused the injury suffered. Although plaintiff argued that the burden
of proof should be reversed since Dr Mercier’s failure to order further x-rays and
neurological examinations placed the victim in a situation where he was
deprived of the information necessary to determine whether he had been
properly treated and thus lacked the means of proving a causal relationship
between the negligent omissions and the prejudice they had caused, the Court
held that the traditional rules of causation should not be set aside :
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21. Ibid. at 1666. Citing Lawson, supra note 13, more particularly at 608, and Morin v. Blais,
[1977] 1 R.C.S. 570 at 580, (1975), 10 N.R. 489 [hereinafter Morin cited to S.C.R.] the
Court stated it could only presume causation “[...] s’il estime que la faute comportant un
danger et que ce danger s’est manifesté [...] sous réserve d’une démonstration ou d’une forte
indication contraire” at 1666.
22. Supra note 13.
Il ne suffit pas de démontrer qu’un défendeur a créé un risque de
préjudice et que le préjudice survienne dans l’aire du risque pour
imposer à ce défendeur le fardeau de réfuter l’existence du lien de
causalité.21 
In this case, the Court found that the spinal cord injury had likely
occurred the night of the accident and not as the result of any subsequent
negligence on the part of Dr Mercier.
The second decision, Zanchettin v. De Montigny22, involved the near-
drowning of a 20 month-old child. The child’s parents discovered him floating
face down in a pond behind their house at about 7 :45 a.m. It would appear that
the child had been in the water for approximately five to seven minutes. After
being pulled from the pond, the child was placed on the kitchen table and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation was attempted. Although an ambulance was
summoned, it was decided to save time by taking the child by car to the
residence of Dr De Montigny, located 7.3 km from their home. Dr De Montigny
did not attempt to resuscitate the child, but instead declared him deceased in
light of the clinical signs he observed during his brief examination. He directed
the parents to proceed to the emergency department of Ste-Croix Hospital in
Drummondville. Upon arrival at the hospital, the emergency room team
undertook advanced resuscitative measures and at 8:47 a.m., cardiac activity was
noted. The child managed to survive but suffered permanent and severe
neurological damage. 
Although suit was brought against Dr De Montigny, the Ste-Croix
Hospital and its emergency-room physician, Dr Lemay, it was eventually
abandoned against the latter two defendants. Plaintiff argued that the remaining
defendant, Dr De Montigny, failed to recognize that the child could have been
suffering from hypothermia and that he should have initiated cardiopulmonary
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23. According to Lawson, supra note 13 at 608.
resuscitation. However, the Superior Court held that Dr De Montigny’s refusal
to undertake active treatment was a reasonable exercise of his professional
judgment and no fault was proven.
Before the Court of Appeal it was again strongly suggested by plaintiff-
appellant that the child was in a state of hypothermia and that had resuscitative
measures been performed by Dr De Montigny, he would probably not have
suffered permanent harm. In addition, appellant felt that the failure to attempt
reanimation deprived him of the possibility of proving that the child’s present
condition resulted from the physician’s fault.
Madam Justice Deschamps, speaking on behalf of the Court of Appeal,
felt that since the trier of fact’s analysis of the evidence was not beyond
reproach, a full review of the evidence adduced was necessary. Although in an
admission, Dr De Montigny acknowledged that although normally in cases of
drowning involving a child, a general practitioner should automatically attempt
to resuscitate, in the present circumstances, his own failure to act would not
have changed the outcome since when he saw the child, the massive
neurological and irreversible sequelae had already been suffered.
An exhaustive review of the evidence failed to convince the Court of
Appeal that the child was in a state of protective hypothermia since he had not
been immersed in freezing water. Also, because cardiopulmonary resuscitation
was not initiated immediately upon the onset of pulselessness, the chances of
providing adequate circulation to the brain would at best have been minimal.
Consequently, there was no proof that Dr De Montigny’s intervention would
have changed the course of events.
Appellant’s claim that he be entitled to benefit from presumptions of
causation was rejected out of hand, the Court of Appeal preferring to reaffirm
that causation should be established according to a preponderance of
probabilities in light of the factual, statistical or presumptive evidence23. In the
present case, the scientific evidence failed to support appellant’s contentions.
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24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. at 609.
26. [1997] R.J.Q. 1332; [1997] R.R.A. 566 (summary), J.E. 97-820 (Sup. Ct.), [hereinafter
Stéfanik cited to R.J.Q].
27. Ibid. at 1354.
The third situation in which a presumption of causation has been
judicially created is one proposed by the Supreme Court in Lawson v.
Laferrière24, involving a woman whose diagnosis of breast cancer had not been
revealed to her by her physician. She sued claiming that had she known the
truth, she would have sought out more agressive treatment for her disease, and
that by failing to inform her of the nature of her condition, she was deprived of
the opportunity of optimizing her chances of remission. In fact, plaintiff died
during the suit and her action was continued by her testamentary executrix.
Defendant physician argued that no matter whether he failed to inform her or
not, the odds were strongly against her surviving the illness, and thus his alleged
fault did not cause her death. Mr. Justice Gonthier, speaking on behalf of the
Court, expressed the view that “[in] some cases, where a fault presents a clear
danger and where such a danger materializes, it may be reasonable to presume
a causal link, unless there is a demonstration or indication to the contrary”.25
Several Quebec cases subsequently followed this lead and were decided
on the basis of the presumption created by Lawson. Stéfanik v. Hôpital Hôtel-
Dieu de Lévis26 is a case in point involving the failure to diagnose the state of
distress and the need to be delivered without delay of the surviving foetus of a
jumellary pregnancy. As a result of this error, the child in question was born
severely handicapped and eventually died at the age of seven after a life of great
suffering. The evidence established that two physicians had committed a fault
of omission in failing to recognize that a foetal development problem had arisen
during the pregnancy. Citing Lawson, Mr. Justice Morin of the Superior Court
asserted that :
[d]ans de telles circonstances, il est raisonnable de présumer du lien de
causalité entre la faute et les dommages, pour reprendre les termes
utilisés par le juge Gonthier. Or, une telle présomption entraîne un
renversement du fardeau de la preuve quant au lien de causalité.27
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28. Supra note 5.
29. Stéfanik, supra note 26 at 1354.
30. [1997] R.J.Q. 2669 (C.A.), on appeal from [1995] R.J.Q. 2923, [1995] R.R.A. 1160 (Sup.
Ct.) [hereinafter Prat].
Morin J. appears also to have adopted Mr. Justice Beauregard’s opinion
as expressed in Gburek28 :
Il est bon de rappeler que c’est une faute d’omission, dans leur
processus diagnostique, qui est reprochée aux défendeurs. Si ces
derniers avaient effectué les tests suggérés par les demandeurs et si ces
tests n’avaient rien indiqué permettant de justifier un accouchement
prématuré, ils pourraient alors invoquer la cause inconnue pour
justifier leurs agissements. En l’absence de tels tests, ils ne peuvent
invoquer ce moyen de défense qui reviendrait à placer les demandeurs
dans une situation impossible, soit celle de tenter de prouver que les
événements ne sont pas dus à une cause inconnue.29  
The same year (1997), in Prat v. Poulin30, involving the suit of a patient
who had suffered a thromboembolism causing partial paralysis and aphasia
following surgery for a bowel obstruction, the question of causation played a
pivotal role. At the time of her surgery, the patient, who was a smoker, was
taking anovulants. Despite government reports warning of the potential danger
of performing elective surgery on a patient using such medication, the surgeon
did not advise her to use alternate means of contraception. A fundamental issue
that had to be resolved was whether her paralysis was caused by the use of
anovulants or whether it was the result of a purely fortuitous event. Mr. Justice
Beauregard, writing on behalf of the panel of the Court of Appeal raised a
presumption of causation against the surgeon  :
À mon humble avis, devant le fait que la thrombose cérébrale a pu être
causée par l’effet des anovulants et de la chirurgie et que l’appelant a
commis une faute en ne recommandant pas à l’intimée d’arrêter de
prendre des anovulants avant la chirurgie, le fardeau incombe à
l’appelant de démontrer l’absence de la relation entre la prise
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31. Ibid. at 2693.
32. [1998] R.J.Q. 2082, [1998] R.R.A. 865 (summary) (C.S.) [hereinafter Mainville].
33. Supra note 30.
34. Supra note 13.
35. Mainville, supra note 32 at 2099.
36. Ibid. at 2099-2100. In the case of Bérubé v. Cloutier, [2000] R.R.A. 484 (Qc. Sup. Ct.),
involving a patient who suffered the consequences of toxic shock syndrome following a
breast reduction, the Superior Court felt that she was entitled to benefit from a presumption
of causation against defendants according to Lawson but that defendants had overcome this
burden of proof.
d’anovulants, la chirurgie et la thrombose cérébrale. Voir Laferrière
c. Lawson [...].31
More recently, the Superior Court in Mainville v. Cité de la Santé de
Laval32 followed the lead of the Court of Appeal in Prat33 and applied the
presumption advanced in Lawson34. Plaintiff Mainville was diagnosed as
suffering from a ruptured spleen. Upon admission to the Cité de la Santé de
Laval hospital, a Foley catheter was installed. Following surgery, the treating
physician ordered that the Foley catheter be removed. This was attempted by a
student nurse acting under the supervision of a qualified nurse acting as her
preceptor. Encountering some difficulty and because of the the pain
experienced by the patient, the student asked her preceptor to help. The latter
withdrew the catheter without difficulty. However, plaintiff was left with a
stenosis of the ureter which required further hospitalization and treatment. 
The Court found that the student nurse had committed a fault in
attempting to withdraw the catheter  while the bulb holding it in place had not
been properly deflated. Once the evidence revealed that the stenosis could have
been caused by the catheter and that a fault had been committed in the course
of its removal, the burden of proving absence of causation devolved to the
hospital35, which would have had to prove that the nursing student had indeed
acted according to the standards of practice and that external factors explained
how the injury occurred36. In the present case, the hospital failed to overcome
this onus.
From presumptions of fact to presumptions of causation :
226 reflections on the perils of judge-made rules (2001) 32 R.D.U.S.
in Quebec medical malpractice law
37. [1946] K.B. 50; [1945] 2 All E.R. 547 (C.A.) [hereinafter Vyner cited to K.B.].
38. Ibid. at 55, per Scott, L.J. Speaking for the Court, Scott L.J. relied on Lord Goddard’s
opinion in Lee v. Nursery Furnishings Ltd., [1945] 1 All E.R. 387 at 390 (U.K. C.A.) : “In
the first place I think one may say this, that where you find there has been a breach of one
of these safety regulations and where you find that the accident complained of is the very
class of accident that the regulations are designed to prevent, a court should certainly not be
astute to find that the breach of the regulation was not connected with the accident, was not
the cause of the accident”.
39. [1956] A.C. 613 (H.L.) [hereinafter Bonnington Castings Ltd.].
As one may see, unlike the other presumptions alluded to above, this
particular presumption of causation has certainly taken root in Quebec liability
law. Because of the important consequences for the parties involved, it would
be interesting, at this point, to attempt to retrace its obscure origins before
discussing the validity of this type of approach.
2 - The ambiguous sources of certain presumptions of causation
It would appear that common law jurisprudence of both English and
Canadian origin has influenced certain decisions rendered under Quebec law.
After examining these common law sources, we will review those of the civil
law in order to verify the accuracy of this initial impression.
a - English and Canadian Common law sources
As one may discover from a perusal of the case-law, the first modern
application of presumed causation occurs in the English Court of Appeal
decision of Vyner v. Waldenberg Brothers Ltd.,37 where a worker had part of his
thumb cut off by a circular saw which he was utilizing in the course of his
duties. Contrary to regulation, the safety guard had not been properly adjusted.
In finding for plaintiff, the Court advanced the proposition that, “[if] there is a
definite breach of a safety provision imposed on the occupier of a factory, and
a workman is injured in a way which could result from the breach, the onus of
proof shifts on to the employer to show that the breach was not the cause”.38
The subsequent case of Bonnington Castings Ltd. v. Wardlaw39 involved
a claim in damages resulting from an employee, Wardlaw, contracting the
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disease of pneumoconiosis while working in a foundry operated by Bonnington
Castings. Pneumoconiosis is caused by inhaling air containing minute particles
of silica. During his employment over a period of eight years, Wardlaw was
exposed to exceedingly fine particles of silica produced by machinery including
pneumatic hammers and swing grinders used in the smoothing or dressing of the
castings. It was admitted that while there were no means of collecting or
neutralizing the dust from the hammers, the dust generated by the swing grinders
escaped into the air of the workshop because the dust-extracting vents for these
grinders had not been kept free from obstruction. Bonnington Castings admitted
it was in breach of regulations by failing to properly maintain the swing grinders
but argued that the pursuer failed to prove that the dust from these grinders
actually caused his disease. Overruling Vyner40 on the issue of the onus of proof
of causation, the House of Lords preferred to reaffirm the orthodoxy of ordinary
standards concerning the evidentiary burden. According to Lord Reid :
It would seem obvious in principle that a pursuer or plaintiff must
prove not only negligence or breach of duty but also that such fault
caused or materially contributed to his injury.  [...]  I can find neither
reason nor authority for the rule being different where there is breach
of statutory duty. The fact that Parliament imposes a duty for the
protection of employees has been held to entitle an employee to sue if
he is injured as a result of a breach of that duty, but it would be going
a great deal farther to hold that it can be inferred from the enactment
of a duty that Parliament intended that any employee suffering injury
can sue his employer merely because there was a breach of duty and
it is shown to be possible that his injury may have been caused by it.
In my judgment, the employee must in all cases prove his case by the
ordinary standard of proof in civil actions : he must make it appear at
least that on a balance of probabilities the breach of duty caused or
materially contributed to his injury.41
Lord Reid found that the disease had indeed been caused by the
cumulative effect of inhaling silica particles from non-culpable (the pneumatic
hammers) and culpable sources (the swing grinders), both of which materially
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contributed to the disease. In order to be causative, according to him, the
contribution must have been more than negligible.
The notion of material contribution, as set out in Bonnington Castings
Ltd.42, was applied in McGhee v. National Coal Board43 involving a worker
employed to clean out brick kilns, who had contracted dermatitis, an irritation
of the skin. Plaintiff invoked two grounds of fault, firstly that the kilns should
have been allowed to cool sufficiently before he was sent to remove the bricks
from them, and secondly, that his employer failed to provide adequate washing
facilities to enable workers to remove the dust and grime from their persons. As
a result, McGhee was obliged to bicycle home at the end of each working day
covered with brick dust which increased the possibility that dermatitis would
occur. While the first contention failed, the second was viewed more favourably.
In the words of Lord Reid : 
It has always been the law that a pursuer succeeds if he can shew that
fault of the defender caused or materially contributed to his injury.
There may have been two separate causes but it is enough if one of the
causes arose from fault of the defender. The pursuer does not have to
prove that this cause would of itself have been enough to cause him
injury.44
For his part, Lord Wilberforce resolved the question of proving causation
in the following terms :
But the question remains whether a pursuer must necessarily fail if,
after he has shown a breach of duty, involving an increase of risk of
disease, he cannot positively prove that this increase of risk caused or
materially contributed to the disease while his employers cannot
positively prove the contrary. In this intermediate case there is an
appearance of logic in the view that the pursuer, on whom the onus
lies, should fail - a logic which dictated the judgments below. The
question is whether we should be satisfied in factual situations like the
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present, with this logical approach. In my opinion, there are further
considerations of importance. First, it is a sound principle that where
a person has, by breach of duty of care, created a risk, and injury
occurs within the area of that risk, the loss should be borne by him
unless he shows that it had some other cause. Secondly, from the
evidential point of view, one may ask, why should a man who is able
to show that his employer should have taken certain precautions,
because without them there is a risk, or an added risk, of injury or
disease, and who in fact sustains exactly that injury or disease, have to
assume the burden of proving more : namely, that it was the addition
to the risk, caused by the breach of duty, which caused or materially
contributed to the injury? In many cases of which the present is
typical, this is impossible to prove, just because honest medical
opinion cannot segregate the causes of an illness between compound
causes. And if one asks which of the parties, the workman or the
employers should suffer from this inherent evidential difficulty, the
answer as a matter of policy or justice should be that it is the creator
of the risk who, ex hypothesi, must be taken to have foreseen the
possibility of damage, who should bear its consequences.45
This apparent reliance in McGhee, upon the ratio of Bonnington
Castings Ltd.46 is not beyond reproach since, as one writer, Jane Stapleton,
points out, Bonnington Castings Ltd. involved injury (an accumulation of silica
in the lungs),  resulting from cumulative contributions from both culpable and
innocent sources, whereas in McGhee, the dermatitis had multiple possible
sources, an innocent cause and a culpable cause47. In the latter case, there was
no proof that the injury was actually “triggered” by the lack of washing
facilities.48  Although Stapleton’s critique of McGhee appears to have been
accepted by the House of Lords in Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority49, the
Lords admitted that there would be nothing irrational in drawing certain
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inferences as a matter of common sense. The inference in question related to the
fact that the consecutive periods during which brick dust remained on McGhee’s
person probably contributed to causing the dermatitis. 
In Wilsher, the issue was whether the retrolental fibroplasia suffered by
a prematurely born infant had in fact been caused by the excessive
administration of oxygen since there was conflicting expert evidence whether
an error of this type had caused or materially contributed to the blindness of the
child. The Court of Appeal decision was reversed in the House of Lords and a
new trial ordered since the lower decisions were rendered on the basis of a
reversal of the burden of proof according to McGhee. With the approval of the
other Law Lords, Lord Bridge stated that McGhee had laid down no new
principle of law whatsoever and merely reaffirmed that the onus of proving
causation rested upon the plaintiff :
Adopting a robust and pragmatic approach to the undisputed primary
facts of the case, the majority concluded that it was a legitimate
inference of fact that the defender’s negligence had materially
contributed to the pursuer’s injury. The decision, in my opinion, is of
no greater significance than that and to attempt to extract from it some
esoteric principle which in some way modifies, as a matter of law, the
nature of the burden of proof of causation which a plaintiff or pursuer
must discharge once he has established a relevant breach of duty is a
fruitless one.50
In cases involving appeals from provincial Common law jurisdictions
before the Supreme Court of Canada, inferences of causation were discussed in
From presumptions of fact to presumptions of causation :
(2001) 32 R.D.U.S. reflections on the perils of judge-made rules 231
in Quebec medical malpractice law
51. Supra note 2.
52. Ibid. at 326-327. In fact, the Quebec Court of Appeal in St-Jean, supra note 17 at 1666
stated that as a result of the Supreme Court decisions in Lawson and Snell, the influence of
McGhee on Quebec law has been greatly attenuated.
53. [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, rev’g [1995] B.C.J. No. 666 (B.C.C.A.), online : QL (BCJ), aff’g
(1994), 44 A.C.W.S. (3d) 908 (Sup. Ct. B.C.).
light of English case-law. The issue, in Snell v. Farrell51 arising from the loss of
sight in one eye following cataract surgery, was whether the fault of the surgeon
while injecting a local anaesthetic had caused optic nerve atrophy. Speaking in
the name of the Court which rendered judgment in favour of plaintiff, Sopinka,
J. reviewed the pertinent principles concerning proof of causation. Approving
Wilsher’s interpretation of McGhee by the House of Lords, the Court felt that the
traditional rules should be followed in determining causation :
I have examined the alternatives arising out of the McGhee case. They
were that the plaintiff simply prove that the defendant created a risk
that the injury which occurred would occur. Or, what amounts to the
same thing, that the defendant has the burden of disproving causation.
If I were convinced that defendants who have a substantial connection
to the injury were escaping liability because plaintiffs cannot prove
causation under currently applied principles, I would not hesitate to
adopt one of these alternatives. In my opinion, however, properly
applied, the principles relating to causation are adequate to the task.
Adoption of either of the proposed alternatives would have the effect
of compensating plaintiffs where a substantial connexion between the
injury and the defendant’s conduct is absent. Reversing the burden of
proof may be justified where two defendants negligently fire in the
direction of the plaintiff and then by their tortious conduct destroy the
means of proof at his disposal. In such a case it is clear that the injury
was not caused by neutral conduct. It is quite a different matter to
compensate a plaintiff by reversing the burden of proof for an injury
that may very well be due to factors unconnected to the defendant and
not the fault of anyone.52 
The Snell decision was followed in Athey v. Leonati53 where one of the
questions raised was whether the medical problem suffered by the plaintiff was
caused by injuries sustained in previous accidents or whether it was ultimately
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attributable to a pre-existing condition. In that case, plaintiff, who had a history
of back problems and who had been subsequently injured in two road accidents,
suffered a herniated disc while taking part in a medically-authorized exercise
program. While reaffirming the principle that in order to succeed plaintiff must
prove causation on a balance of probabilites, the causation test was not to be
applied too rigidly. According to Major J., speaking on behalf of the Court, “[...]
in some circumstances an inference of causation may be drawn from the
evidence without positive scientific proof.”54 In the present case, it was
reasonable to infer a causal connection between the road accidents, both of
which caused serious back injuries, and the herniated disc resulting from mild
exercise.
b - Quebec Civil law sources
On occasion, the Supreme Court of Canada has inferred causation in
cases originating in Quebec. For instance, in Montreal Tramways Co. v.
Léveillé55  it had concluded that as a presumption of fact under article 1242 Civil
Code of Lower Canada [hereinafter C.C.L.C] (article 2849 Civil Code of
Quebec [hereinafter C.C.Q.]), the deformity of a new-born child’s feet was
caused by her mother’s fall from a tramway car during pregnancy. According to
Lamont J.,
That such a fault caused the deformity of the child cannot, from the
nature of things, be established by direct evidence. It may, however,
be established by a presumption or inference drawn from facts proved
to the satisfaction of the jury. These facts must be consistent one with
the other and must furnish data from which the presumption can be
reasonably drawn. It is not sufficient that the evidence affords material
for a conjecture that the child’s deformity may have been due to the
consequences of the mother’s accident. It must go further and be
sufficient to justify a reasonable man in concluding, not as a mere
guess or conjecture, but as a deduction from the evidence, that there
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is a reasonable probability that the deformity was due to such
accident.56
The more recent case of Laferrière57, the facts of which are described
above, provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court, not only to deal with the
notion of “loss of chance” but also to clarify the rules concerning proof of
causation. Rejecting the possibility of claiming for a loss of chance of surviving
breast cancer, the Court acknowledged that the patient had nonetheless suffered
psychologically. She had been deprived of the opportunity of pursuing earlier
treatment which could have led to some improvement and would probably have
provided for a better quality of life. Speaking for the majority, Gonthier J.
insisted that proof of causation had to be established on a balance of
probabilities taking into account “[...] all the evidence which is before it, factual,
statistical and that which the judge is entitled to presume”.58  Moreover, he
issued the following dictum strongly reminiscent of McGhee, but citing the
Supreme Court case of Morin v. Blais59 as authority :
In some cases, where a fault presents clear danger for the health and
security of the patient and where such a danger materializes, it may be
reasonable for a judge to presume the causal link between the fault and
such damage, ‘unless there is a demonstration or strong indication to
the contrary’ [...]. If after all has been considered, the judge is not
satisfied that the fault has, on his or her assessment of the balance of
probabilities, caused any actual damage to the  patient, recovery
should be denied. To do otherwise would be to subject doctors to an
exceptional regime of civil responsibility.60 
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In Morin, a road-accident case, the issue involved determining whether
the absence of a left rear light on the back of a tractor was the cause of a fatal
collision. On behalf of the majority, which apportioned fault equally between
both drivers, Beetz J. wrote :
The mere breach of a regulation does not give rise to the offender’s
civil liability if it does not cause injury to anyone. However, many
traffic provisions lay down elementary standards of care and make
them binding regulations at the same time. Breach of such regulations
constitues civil fault. In cases where such fault is immediately
followed by an accident which the standard was expressly designed to
prevent, it is reasonable to presume that there is a causal link between
the fault and the accident, unless there is a demonstration or strong
indication to the contrary.61
Interestingly enough, Beetz J. referred to the Quebec Court of Appeal
case of Charest v. Ouellet62 which dealt with a similar factual situation but
which otherwise made no allusion to any inference of causation. Did the
majority in Morin intend to judicially create a normative presumption, or was
causation inferred from the circumstances of the accident? In his comment on
this case, P.-G. Jobin concluded that the Court had merely applied the rules
governing presumptions of fact in conformity with article 1242 C.C.L.C., which,
as is also the case according to the Civil Code of Quebec, remains essentially
discretionary in nature63. This opinion appears to have been followed by J.-P.
Ménard64, as well as by J.-L. Baudouin and P. Deslauriers in the 5th edition of
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their book, La responsabilité civile65. Originally, article 1242 C.C.L.C. read as
follows, 
Presumptions not established by law are left to the discretion
and judgment of the court.
In the more recent Civil Code of Quebec at article 2849, the drafters retained the
text of the Civil Code of Lower Canada while adding to it the phrase “[...] which
shall take only serious, precise and concordant presumption into consideration”.
Just how valid are these opinions when one considers that Beetz J. makes this
affirmation in Morin66 without any indication that he intended to infer causation
by presumption of fact?
One is thus confronted by the inevitable question - are the principles
concerning proof of causation in Morin and its offspring Lawson,
unacknowledged throw-backs to McGhee whose own lineage has been cast into
doubt by the House of Lords, or are they indeed merely teleological67
applications of civilian presumptions of fact? In order to provide a credible
answer, one must first review the conditions which must be fulfilled in order to
invoke proof of causation by presumption of fact before attempting to compare
presumptions of fact to principles of presumed causation of jurisprudential
origin.
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3 - Presumptions of fact and causation : the hazards inherent in the
indiscriminate reception of a principle from another legal system
As pointed out, although the Civil Code of Lower Canada, unlike the
Civil Code of Quebec,  did not formally enunciate this requirement as to the
quality of presumptions of fact, it had been generally admitted under the
previous Code that the presumptions must be serious, precise and concordant.
The Quebec Court of Appeal, in a case unrelated to medical liability, quoted
with approval the French writer Larombière’s analysis of these notions of
“serious, precise and concordant” :
Les présomptions sont graves, lorsque les rapports du fait connu au
fait inconnu sont tels que l’existence de l’un établit, par une induction
puissante, l’existence de l’autre [...].
Les présomptions sont précises, lorsque les inductions qui résultent du
fait connu tendent à établir directement et particulièrement le fait
inconnu et contesté. S’il était également possible d’en tirer les
conséquences différentes et mêmes contraires, d’en inférer l’existence
de faits divers et contradictoires, les présomptions n’auraient aucun
caractère de précision et ne ferait naître que le doute et l’incertitude.
Elles sont enfin concordantes, lorsque, ayant toutes une origine
commune ou différente, elles tendent, par leur ensemble et leur accord,
à établir le fait qu’il s’agit de prouver. [...] Si [...] elles se contredisent
[...] et se neutralisent, elles ne sont plus concordantes, et le doute seul
peut entrer dans l’esprit du magistrat.68
With regard to the specific question of causation, in order to conform to
the codal requirements that the presumption be serious, precise and concordant
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once the fault of an identified defendant has been determined, this would imply
that by a preponderance of the evidence, it is established that plaintiff suffered
harm and, in the absence of direct proof, in all probability, defendant’s fault
indeed caused the harm suffered.
It should be noted that as in the case of other forms of proof69 with the
exception of presumptions of law, presumptions of fact cannot serve to create
presumptions of fault or of causation. Only a text of law can create a legal
presumption70. Unlike legal presumptions, which exempt a party from having to
provide complete proof, presumptions of fact serve as a means of proving certain
factual elements71. Moreover, presumptions of fact are a form of inductive
reasoning72 signifying that one proceeds from individual facts to arrive at general
conclusions, or in other words, that one infers an outcome from the observation
of particular circumstances. If one were to proceed on the basis of a general
postulate set out in advance in order to infer a certain result in a given fact-
situation, this would constitute a form of deductive reasoning and thus
antithetical to civilian presumptions of fact.
Obviously, when the courts set out a rule of general application under
which an inference of causation may be drawn, (as in the cases of Morin and
Lawson), one is no longer in the realm of inductive reasoning but rather in the
presence of a general legal presumption of praetorian origin which would
appear, at first blush, to usurp the role of the legislator and to run counter to
article 2811 C.C.Q. As L. Baudouin has written,
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Légales, les présomptions ne sont admises que s’il y a un texte spécial.
On ne peut en conséquence en établir ou créer par voie
d’interprétation, par identité de motifs ou de situation.73
One can only surmise the causes of this phenomenon. The most obvious
would appear to be a desire to level the playing-field in situations where the
relative strengths of the parties to a medical malpractice suit are, over and above
the basic rule governing the burden of proof, heavily weighted in favour of the
defendant. Costs aside, the difficulty of establishing fault and causation in a field
where scientific complexity, if not obfuscation, often obscures the truth,
provides a powerful incentive for the courts to propose equitable solutions74.
This very likely occurs without consciously adverting to the more fundamental
implications of the judicial creation of certain rules of proof.
Another cause derives from the failure of the courts to recognize that
what they perceive as the mere act of interpreting codal provisions is in fact
judicial rule-making. Professor Jean-Louis Baudouin, (as he then was), readily
acknowledged the reality of this phenomenon :
Although similar in legal theory, the role played by legislation in legal
practice is different to a certain extent in Louisiana and Quebec from
that of countries like France. That difference lies mostly in the attitude
of the courts towards legislation as a source of law. One may feel that
in Quebec [...], the degree of respect for legislation, and for basic
principles implied by it, is less than it is in France. Moreover, the
‘interpretation’ of legislation will in certain circumstances be so broad
as to allow under this disguise the introduction into the civil law of
solutions devised by the imagination of the judiciary itself.75
One must also take into account a certain leniency on the part of the
courts in observing the differences  between the common law and the civil law
From presumptions of fact to presumptions of causation :
(2001) 32 R.D.U.S. reflections on the perils of judge-made rules 239
in Quebec medical malpractice law
76. J.-L Baudouin, “L’interprétation du Code civil québécois par la Cour suprême du Canada”
(1975) 53 Can. B.R. 715 at 717.
77. Ibid. at 717.
78. C. Lemieux, “Jurisprudence et sécurité juridique : une perpective civiliste”, (1998-99) 29
R.D.U.S. 223 at 226. According to J.E.C. Brierley, R.A. Macdonald in M. Boodman, J.E.C.
Brierley, R.A. Macdonald, Quebec Civil Law; an Introduction to Quebec Private Law,
Toronto, Edmond Montgomery Publications, 1993 at 122, “Such institutional
considerations, along with a judicial methodology and organization of courts derived from
the Common law, have been present in Quebec Civil law for more than 200 years. For this
reason, the decisions of courts have a vocation in Quebec that far exceeds the role they are
traditionally ascribed.”
79. Lemieux ibid. at 235.
approaches. Each legal system constitutes a complex entity with its own
substantive rules, legal theories and principles of interpretation76. When one
borrows a principle from another legal system, it is imperative to not lose sight
of the fact that the host system may unconsciously be importing notions derived
from a sociologically, economically and juridically discrete reality77.  Each legal
system possesses its own genius, the parameters of which may become obscured
in a mixed jurisdiction such as Quebec. Prof. C. Lemieux underlines the perils
of having a magistracy fulfilling its functions in a mixed jurisdiction, which
would include the possibility of viewing the civil law as highly permeable, as
well as exaggerating the relative importance to be attributed to jurisprudence as
a source of law78. She emphasizes the fundamental differences between the
common law and the civil law in the following terms :
La common law repose sur la jurisprudence et obéit à un raisonnement
inductif, allant ainsi du particulier au général, c’est-à-dire partant d’un
cas particulier pour en tirer une règle applicable (sous forme de
jugement). Le droit civil quant à lui repose sur la loi et obéit à un
raisonnement déductif, allant ainsi du général au particulier, c’est-à-
dire partant d’une règle générale (la loi) pour l’appliquer à un cas
particulier. Le statut de la jurisprudence, qui est la première source du
droit en common law, est donc hiérarchiquement inférieur en droit
civil, où la jurisprudence ne sert officiellement qu’à interpréter le droit
et non pas à le créer, ce qui est d’abord le rôle de la loi.79
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As a result, the courts may indeed infer causation in certain situations
through the rigorous application of presumptions of fact in conformity with the
codal requirements that they be serious, precise and concordant80. But by the
same token, they must resist the temptation of adopting convenient a priori rules
which circumvent the rather demanding requirements imposed by the Civil
Code. Rather, the courts must determine whether the circumstances of a
particular case clearly conduce to an inference of causation. Otherwise, in case
of ambiguity, the burden of proof should be deemed not to have been met81.
Conclusion
Unless certain actions on the part of defendants are undertaken with the
intention of destroying evidence, a failure to maintain accurate records or to
perform certain tests cannot automatically lead to a reversal of the burden of
proof of causation. Otherwise, such a reversal would almost always result  in a
determination of liability for wrongful conduct otherwise unrelated to the harm
suffered. If a defendant did act with a view to covering his of her errors or
omissions, an unfavourable inference could be drawn by the courts because one
would be profiting from egregious conduct destined to subvert the discovery of
the truth. Although generally utilized in other contexts, the maxim malitiis non
est indulgendum would seem germane. 
While in Léveillé82, causation was avowedly proven by presumption of
fact, the obscure origin of the presumptions of causation posited in Morin83 and
subsequently in Lawson84 raises the suspicion that they are of common law
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inspiration85, more particularly through the influence of McGhee86, and
introduced into the Civil law by way of the Supreme Court. Paradoxically, these
presumptions have taken on a life of their own in Quebec law even though
Wilsher87 and Snell88 have subsequently refused to follow McGhee.
Obviously, the criticisms expressed in this commentary are not intended
to intensify the already onerous burden of proof assumed by plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases but rather to query the validity of any well-intentioned
attempts by the courts to alleviate this burden through the application of certain
judge-made presumptions of ambiguous origin. The choices are obvious; either
the legislator must create a legal presumption relating to causation along the
lines of the dicta in Morin89 and Lawson90, or Quebec courts, through a rigorous
application of the rules relating to presumptions of fact, will have to infer
causation from the circumstances of each case without reference to a general
presumption which may have been concocted in the style of a common law
binding precedent.
